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FTC REGULATION OF UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE
ADVERTISING: CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW
William C. Holmes*
Advertising practices that are unfair or deceptive have long been pro-
hibited by the Federal Trade Commission Act. Yet, as Mr. Holmes indi-
cates, considerable uncertainty still exists concerning the meaning of the
terms "unfair" and "deceptive" as they are used in the Act. To help bring
needed clarity to the subject, this Article provides an extensive analysis of
the applicable legal principles and the various practices that have been
prohibited. Mr. Holmes then proposes guidelines to assist the practitioner
in analyzing the legality of particular advertisements.
The regulation of advertising by the Federal Trade Commission has un-
dergone many significant refinements and modifications during recent years.
New concepts have evolved, while other pre-existing doctrines have been
altered to fit altogether new fact situations. The result has been considerable
confusion for advertisers and practitioners alike concerning the requirements
of the law of advertising mandated by the principal regulatory provision
governing the subject-section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC
Act).'
This Article provides needed guidance on the subject by summarizing the
current status of the law. Of necessity, the following discussion is by no
means an all-encompassing blueprint of everything the law of advertising
requires or may require in the future. The various legal principles that will
be discussed are protean concepts that continue to change with new fact
situations. Nevertheless, advertisers and practitioners should find the Article
helpful in determining where the law stands today and where it is likely to go
in the future.
First, the Article presents a broad overview of the governing legal princi-
ples, including a discussion of the Commission's remedial powers respecting
unfair or deceptive advertising practices. Second, particular types of prac-
tices that have been held unlawful are analyzed, including directly false or
misleading advertisements, impliedly false or misleading advertisements,
* Staff Attorney, Federal Trade Commission, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., Stanford University;
J.D., Harvard University. The views expressed in this Article are the author's own and should
not be taken as representing those of the Federal Trade Commission or any individual Commis-
sioner.
1. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). For other
viewpoints concerning the law of advertising, as regulated by the Federal Trade Commission,
see S. KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1979) [hereinafter cited as KANWIT]; C. ROSDEN &
P. ROSDEN, THE LAW OF ADVERTISING (1978) [hereinafter cited as ROSDEN]; Hammer, FTC
Knights and Consumer Daze: The Regulation of Deceptive or Unfair Advertising, 32 ARK. L.
REv. 446 (1978); Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 439 (1964); Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertis-
ing, 90 HARV. L. REv. 661 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Pitofsky]; Note, Developments in the
Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1005 (1967).
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advertisements that fail to disclose material information, unsubstantiated
advertising claims, and unfair advertisements that are not deceptive. In the
conclusion, a checklist of factors based upon the governing legal principles
and the decisional law is offered for advertisers and practitioners to consider
when assessing the legality of particular advertising practices.
OVERVIEW OF BASIC PRINCIPLES
The fundamental source of Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction over
advertising is section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 2 In relevant
part, section 5 prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce." 3  While the terms "unfair or deceptive" are both broad and
ambiguous, they are not defined in the FTC Act itself. Rather, the precise
construction and interpretation of these terms has been left to the Commis-
sion and the courts. 4 Later sections of this Article discuss particular types of
advertising practices that have been held unfair or deceptive. 5 Discussion of
specific practices is accordingly deferred to those sections of the Article. For
the moment, it is enough to note some of the general substantive rules that
govern the law of advertising as regulated by the Federal Trade Commission.
First, as used in section 5 of the FTC Act, the term "unfair" act or practice
overlaps and goes beyond the term "deceptive" act or practice. Thus, an
advertisement that is not "deceptive" may nevertheless be held "unfair."
As a practical matter, this distinction is ordinarily not significant, since most
illegal advertising practices are treated as being false or misleading and,
therefore, as being both unfair and deceptive. 7 Nevertheless, the theoretical
2. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
3. Specifically, section 5 provides: "Unfair methods of competition in or affecting com-
merce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlaw-
ful." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
4. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965). The Colgate-Palmolive
case contains one of the most authoritative statements concerning the role of the courts and the
Commission in construing section 5. According to the Court:
This statutory scheme necessarily gives the Commission an influential role in inter-
preting § 5 and in applying it to the facts of particular cases arising out of unprece-
dented situations.. . . Nevertheless, while informed judicial interpretation is depen-
dent upon enlightenment gained from administrative experience, in the last analysis,
the words "deceptive practices" set forth a legal standard and they must get their
final meaning from judicial construction.
Id. at 385. See also FTC v. R. F. Keppell & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 310-12 (1934); FTC v.
Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 648 (1931).
5. See notes 45-135 and accompanying text infra.
6. See KANWIT, supra note 1, §§ 4.03, .05, .06; Craswell, The Identification of Unfair Acts
and Practices by the Federal Trade Commission, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 107; Pitofsky, supra note 1,
at 680-87; Note, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act-Unfairness to Consumers,
1972 Wis. L. REV. 1071.
7. See, e.g., In re Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 427 (1972) (holding that it
is both unfair and deceptive to make specific advertising claims affecting the safety of potentially
dangerous products without prior reasonable data to substantiate the claims), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); In re Arthur Murray Studio of Wash., Inc., 78
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distinction between the two concepts should be kept clearly in mind. A later
section of the Article examines the unfairness doctrine in some detail, includ-
ing significant recent developments in the Commission's own interpretation
of the doctrine.8
A second principle fundamental to the law of advertising is that in deter-
mining whether an advertisement is unfair or deceptive, it is necessary to
look beyond the specific words and phrases used in the advertisement and to
assess the overall impression conveyed to the consumer.9 Literal truth is not
a defense if the advertising can be interpreted in a misleading way.' 0 More-
over, when an advertisement can be interpreted by the consumer in both a
misleading and a truthful manner, it will be considered misleading."'
An additional basic principle is that, when determining whether an adver-
tisement is "deceptive," it is not necessary to show that anyone has actually
been deceived.' 2  Rather, the test is whether the advertisement has the
tendency or capacity to deceive.13 In making this determination, the Com-
mission is not required to take actual consumer testimony, although such
testimony can be particularly probative. Instead, the Commission can rely
upon its own reading and interpretation of the impact of the advertisement
upon consumers. 14
A closely related general principle is that an advertisement may violate
section 5, even though it would not deceive or mislead an average consumer,
F.T.C. 401, 430 (1971) (holding both unfair and deceptive the practice of using trick advertise-
ments, followed by high pressure sales techniques, to induce consumers into buying a service at
exorbitant prices), a f'd, 458 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972).
8. See notes 116-35 and accompanying text infra.
9. See, e.g., Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976) ("advertising...
must be judged by viewing it as a whole, without emphasizing isolated words or phrases apart
from their context"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884,
889-90 (6th Cir. 1967) (Commission not bound by literal meaning of words); Carter Prods., Inc.
v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1963) (Commission may look to overall impact of entire
advertisement). See also FTC v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963); P.
Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir. 1950).
10. E.g., Koch v. FTC, 206 F.2d 311, 317 (6th Cir. 1953). See also cases cited in note 9
supra.
11. See, e.g., Simeon Mgm't Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 (9th Cir. 1978); Country
Tweeds, Inc. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 1964); Murray Space Shoe Corp. v. FTC, 304
F.2d 270, 272 (2d Cir. 1962); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 511 (1980), enforced
sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 385 (9th cir. 1982).
12. See, e.g., Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979); Resort
Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975);
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967); FTC v. Sterling Drugs,
Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963).
13. See, e.g., Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. FTC, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979);
Simeon Mgm't Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 n.ll (9th Cir. 1978); Beneficial Corp. v.
FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
14. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, .391-92 (1965); Simeon Mgm't
Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 n.l (9th Cir. 1978); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. FTC, 577
F.2d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 1978); Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921,
925 (6th Cir. 1968); Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir. 1963).
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if it has the tendency or capacity to deceive a significant group of persons
toward whom the advertisement is directed.' 5 This principle, sometimes
referred to as the test of the "ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous," 6
is not without its limitations, however. For example, in In re Universe Co., 7
the Commission rejected a challenge to the legality of an advertising claim
that a swimming aid would be "invisible" when worn. The Commission
concluded that it would be "too far-fetched" to assume that the buying
public would take the claim literally, rather than simply as meaning "incon-
spicuous." In so concluding, the Commission observed:
True, as has been reiterated many times, the Commission's responsibility is
to prevent deception of the gullible and credulous, as well as the cautious
and knowledgeable. This principle loses its validity, however, if it is
applied uncritically or pushed to an absurd extreme .... A representation
does not become "false and deceptive" merely because it will be unreason-
ably misunderstood by an insignificant and unrepresentative segment of
the class of persons to whom the representation is addressed. If, however,
advertising is aimed at a specially susceptible group of people (e.g., chil-
dren), its truthfulness must be measured by the impact it will make on
them, not on others to whom it is not primarily directed.'
Just as proof of actual deception is not an essential element in a section 5
advertising case,' it is not necessary to prove an "intent to deceive." 2 0  The
advertiser's good or bad faith in disseminating a false or misleading adver-
tisement is irrelevant. 2' Further, it is not even required that the advertiser
know that the advertisement is possibly false or misleading. 22 A recent case
illustrating the outer limits of these governing principles is the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC,2 3 which involved false
15. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937); FTC v. Sterling
Drugs, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963); P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th
Cir. 1950). See generally KANWIT, supra note 1, § 4.03; ROSDEN, supra note 1, § 10.02; Millstein,
The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 439, 457-61 (1964);
Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 675-76.
16. Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942).
17. 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963), af'd, 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964). See also Standard Oil Co. of
Cal. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 1978) (although the law protects "the ignorant,
unthinking, and incredulous," an advertisement will not be given a patently absurd interpreta-
tion).
18. 63 F.T.C. at 1290 (citation omitted).
19. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
20. See, e.g., Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 983 (1977); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967); FTC v.
Sterling Drugs, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C.
406, 517 n.9 (1980), enforced sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir.
1982).
21. See, e.g., Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC, 392 F.2d 921, 925 (6th
Cir. 1968); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 896 (9th Cir. 1960); Koch v. FTC, 206 F.2d 311, 317 (6th
Cir. 1953); Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175, 181 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668
(1941).
22. See, e.g., Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578, 579 (2d Cir. 1941).
23. 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).
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advertising claims concerning nonprescription weight reduction tablets. An
FTC proceeding was brought not only against the manufacturer of the
product and the advertising agency that prepared the advertisements, but
also against a retailer who participated in the manufacturer's cooperative
advertising program. The court noted that the retailer's only involvement
with the advertising was its participation in the advertising program, and
that there was no showing that it had any knowledge of the deficiencies in
the ads. 24 The retailer was nevertheless held fully liable as an "advertiser. '25
Knowledge may become relevant, however, when the action is not against
the manufacturing or retailing advertiser but against an advertising agency
that prepared the advertisement in accordance with the instructions of the
actual advertiser. For example, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Doherty,
Clifford, Steers & Shenfield, Inc. v. FTC,2" involved a section 5 proceeding
against an advertising agency as well as a manufacturer for preparing and
disseminating ads that misrepresented the effectiveness of a throat lozenge in
treating sore throats. The advertisements had been created by the ad agency
for the manufacturer in accordance with the information provided by the
manufacturer. In upholding a Commission order against the ad agency as
well as the manufacturer, the Sixth Circuit stated that-for liability to attach
in such a situation, the agency must "participate actively" in the deception
and "must know or have reason to know of the falsity of the advertising."2 7
The court concluded that, at the very least, the agency should have known of
the deception involved in the case because the advertisements it prepared
"went far beyond" the more modest claims appearing in the materials pro-
vided by the manufacturer.2 8 Given the standard of "active participation"
plus actual or constructive "knowledge" prescribed by the court, the agency
presumably would not have been held liable had the advertisements it pre-
pared gone no further than the substantiating materials provided by the
manufacturer.
Once the Commission has determined that an advertisement is unfair or
deceptive, it has extremely broad discretion to shape the relief needed to
terminate the unlawful advertising practice and to prevent its recurrence. 29
24. Id. at 297.
25. Id. at :309.
26. 392 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1968).
27. Id. at 928.
28. Id. at 929. See also Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 309 (7th Cir. 1979)
(general discussion of various ad agency liability cases), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980);
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 660 (9th Cir. 1978) (ad agency held liable
where, "given the degree of participation" by the ad agency in preparation of challenged ad, "it
knew or should have known" that ad was misleading); Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523,
534 (5th Cir. 1963) (ad agency held liable where it extensively participated in deception). See
generally KANWIT, supra note 1, § 22.13.
29. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 (1965) ("Commission has
wide discretion in determining the type of order that is necessary to cope with unfair practices
found"); Simeon Mgm't Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1147 (9th Cir. 1978) ("order [of Commis-
sion] will be upheld unless it has no reasonable relation to practices found to be unlawful"). See
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The basic statutory source of the Commission's general remedial powers is
section 5(b) of the FTC Act, 30 which empowers the Commission to issue
"cease and desist" orders that prohibit companies from engaging in unfair or
deceptive acts or practices. 3' The expansive language of section 5(b) has
been construed to support not only straightforward orders to cease engaging
in specific unlawful practices 32 but, in addition, more novel remedial provi-
sions, such as orders requiring the affirmative disclosure of specified product
information, 33 corrective advertising designed to cure the lingering effects of
past advertising practices, 34 notices to past purchasers to counteract the
also FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428-29 (1957); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S.
470, 473 (1952); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-13 (1946).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (b) (Supp. IV 1980).
31. Note that the Supreme Court initially viewed the FTC's cease and desist powers under
section 5 narrowly, as empowering the Commission only to order relief clearly of a "cease and
desist" nature. FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619, 623-24 (1927). The restrictive position
taken in Kodak has, however, since been rejected by the Supreme Court. See FTC v. Dean Foods
Co., 384 U.S. 597, 606 n.4 (1966); Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S.
296, 311-13 (1963). See also Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978).
32. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965) (upholding Commission
order prohibiting use of deceptive product performance demonstrations for any of company's
products when company had repeatedly used deceptive demonstrations in television commer-
cials); FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937) (upholding Commission order prohib-
iting use of deceptive claims as to "reduced" prices, "free" goods, and third-party product
testimonials); National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977)
(upholding, with minor modifications, Commission order prohibiting industry trade association
from advertising that there was no scientific evidence of health risk associated with product,
when issue was actually in scientific dispute), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); ITT Continental
Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding Commission order prohibiting
misrepresentations concerning growth properties of any of company's bread products). See also
cases cited in note 45 infra.
33. See, e.g., Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979) (upholding
Commission order requiring affirmative disclosure of a health risk associated with product, if
used by certain groups of consumers), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); Simeon Mgm't Corp. v.
FTC, 579 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding Commission order requiring affirmative disclo-
sure of fact that a drug was not FDA-approved, when consumers would otherwise tend to
assume from ads that drug was so approved); J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir.
1967) (upholding Commission order requiring affirmative disclosure that most people suffering
from particular symptoms stressed in company's ads do not suffer from problems that the
company's product could treat); Waltham Watch Co. v. FTC, 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir.) (upholding
Commission order requiring affirmative disclosure that the company's products were not, as
inferred in ads, manufactured by the same well-known manufacturer whose trademark it had
acquired), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963); Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952 (2d
Cir.) (upholding Commission order requiring affirmative disclosure that company's lotion for
baldness was not effective in treating most cases of baldness), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960).
34. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (upholding
Commission order requiring company to run "corrective advertisements" to counteract lingering
effects in minds of consumers of over fifty years of false advertising claims that company's
product could treat colds and sore throats), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978). See also In re
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398 (1972) (Commission declined to order corrective
advertising but asserted that such relief is within its remedial powers), af'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th
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misimpressions created by past advertisements, 35 and substantiation of ad-
vertising claims by reasonable supporting data. 36
The Commission's arsenal of remedial powers was further expanded by
amendments to the FTC Act in 1975 37 that expressly empower the Commis-
sion to seek "consumer redress" and "civil penalties" in the courts for viola-
tions of Commission Trade Regulation Rules 38 and cease and desist orders.
New sections 19(a) and 19(b) were added to the Act, 39 authorizing the
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); In re AMF, Inc., 95 F.T.C. 310 (1980) (consent order
requiring manufacturer to produce and distribute public service corrective advertisements); In re
Ocean Spray Cranberries, 80 F.T.C. 975 (1972) (consent order requiring corrective advertising);
In re ITT-Continental Baking Co., 79 F.T.C. 248 (1971) (same). But see National Comm'n on
Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977) (striking down corrective advertising
provision when proven deception had not occurred long enough to have had lingering effect
upon consumers), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). See generally KANWIT, supra note 1,
§ 22.11; Mann & Gurol, An Objective Approach to Detecting and Correcting Deceptive Adver-
tiring, 54 NoTRE DAME LAW. 73 (1978); Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 692-701.
35. See, e.g., In re Travel King, 86 F.T.C. 715 (1975) (requiring notification of past
purchasers endangered by false advertising claims that company's service, "psychic surgery," was
substitute for normal medical care). See also In re Montgomery Ward & Co., 95 F.T.C. 265
(1980) (consent order requiring notification of past purchasers of safety hazard created by past
advertising claims and of availability of repair and refund options).
36. See, e.g., Jay Norris, Inc. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir.) (upholding, with minor
modifications, Commission order requiring mail-order company to substantiate all safety or
performance claims for any of its products with prior "competent and objective material avail-
able in written form"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C.
406 (1980) (ordering Sears to substantiate performance claims for major home appliances with
prior competent scientific test data), appeal docketed No. 80-7368 (9th Cir. 1981); In re
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398 (1972) (ordering company to substantiate safety-
related advertising claims concerning its tires with prior competent scientific tests), afJ'd, 481
F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
37. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
93-637, § 202, 88 Stat. 2193 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 57a, 57b (1976)).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (m)(1)(a), 57b (1976) (originally enacted as Magnuson-Moss Warranty-
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 205, 88 Stat. 2200 (1975).
The amendment established the Commission's authority to promulgate and enforce FTC Trade
Regulation Rules. 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.7-.20 (1981). An FTC Trade Regulation Rule specifically
defines particular acts or practices as unfair or deceptive within the meaning of section 5. 16
C.F.R. §§ 400.1-460.24 (1981). These rules have the force and effect of law and, like individual
cease and desist orders, are enforceable by actions for civil penalties or consumer redress.
Supplementing this rule-making authority is the Commission's issuance of Industry Guides.
Unlike Trade Regulation Rules, these Guides are purely interpretive and do not constitute
substantive rules of law. The Guides are, however, definite indicators of particular acts or
practices that the Commission considers violative of section 5. See, e.g., In re Gimbel Bros., 61
F.T.C. 1051, 1072-73 (1962).
For the text of current and pending FTC Trade Regulation Rules, see [1980] 4 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 1 38,000-,050. A number of these Rules affect various forms of advertising such as
advertising of franchises, eyeglasses, vocational schools, antacids, foods, and protein supple-
ments.
For the text of current FTC Industry Guides, see [1980] 4 TRADE REG. REI. (CCH) 39,001-,
057. The Guides cover a number of diverse advertising practices such as bait advertising,
deceptive advertising of guarantees, deceptive price advertising, and advertising endorsements.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 57b (a)-(b) (1976).
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Commission to seek court ordered "consumer redress," such as rescission or
reformation of contracts, refunds, damages, or public notification, where a
company either: (1) violates a Trade Regulation Rule promulgated by the
Commission, even though the company is ignorant of the Rule; 40 or (2)
engages in an unfair or deceptive act or practice which a "reasonable man"
would have "known" under the circumstances was "dishonest or fraudu-
lent," and the Commission issues a final cease and desist order against the
company. 41 In addition, a new section 5(m) was added to the FTC Act, 42
empowering the Commission to seek "civil penalties" in the courts where a
company: (1) violates a Trade Regulation Rule promulgated by the Commis-
sion with "actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied" that its conduct
was "unfair or deceptive" and "prohibited" by the Rule; 4 3 or (2) engages in
an act or practice already determined to be "unfair or deceptive" in a final
Commission cease and desist order against that company, or anyone else,
with "actual knowledge" that such act or practice is "unfair or deceptive and
...unlawful. "44
40. 15 U.S.C. § 57b (a)(1) (1976). Note that "knowledge" is not an element of a consumer
redress action brought for violation of a Trade Regulation Rule; only the fact of the violation
need be shown. In addition, an action may be brought in federal or state court for consumer
redress involving a Rule violation without first bringing a separate administrative proceeding.
See generally KANWIT, supra note 1, § 21; Kinter & Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade
Commission as a Formidable Consumer Protection Agency, 26 MERa L. REV. 651 (1975).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 57b (a)(2) (1976). Unlike an action based upon violation of a Trade
Regulation Rule, see note 40 supra, a consumer redress action based upon practices prohibited by
a cease and desist order involves an initial administrative proceeding before the Federal Trade
Commission. Following that proceeding and the issuance of the Commission's final cease and
desist order, a subsequent action is brought in the federal or state courts for consumer redress
based upon the practices found to be unlawful in the administrative proceeding. See, e.g., FTC
v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
A special standard applies in the court action-proof that a "reasonable man" would have
"known" that the practices were "dishonest or fraudulent." The meaning of these words has not
yet been hammered out in the courts, although the terms presumably mean something more than
mere "deception" and something less than "criminal fraud." See generally KANWIT, supra note 1,
§ 21.03; Kintner & Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a Formidable
Consumer Protection Agency, 26 MmcEa L. REV. 651 (1975).
42. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (1976).
43. Id. § 45(m)(1)(A). Actual or constructive "knowledge" is an element here, whereas
knowledge is not an element in a section 19 action, id. § 57b, for consumer redress based upon
violation of a Trade Regulation Rule. See note 40 supra.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (1976). The "knowledge" requirement is more demanding here
than that for a Rule violation. See note 43 supra. Actual knowledge that the practice is "unfair or
deceptive" and "unlawful" must be shown. If this knowledge test is met, however, an action for
civil penalties under this subsection can be based upon conduct of the type prohibited by an FTC
order issued against an altogether different company. If the company is itself under an order and
violates that order, the Commission can then alternatively bring an action for civil penalties in a
district court under a different provision of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(1) (1976). This latter
provision does not contain a "knowledge" requirement, since it is limited to violations of orders
directed against the violators themselves. Id. See generally KANWIT, supra note 1, §§ 10.06-.09;
Bickert, Civil Penalties Under Section 5(m) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 44 U. Cni. L.
REV. 761 (1977).
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Particularly since the enactment of the 1975 amendments to the FTC Act,
it is no exaggeration to say that the Commission's remedial powers in adver-
tising cases are extremely expansive. It is, therefore, very important that
advertisers and practitioners alike familiarize themselves with the general
substantive rules that govern the FTC law of advertising, so as not to become
unwitting participants in potentially costly FTC proceedings. Accordingly,
the next section of this Article discusses some of the specific advertising
practices that have been held unlawful under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
SPECIFIC PROBLEM AREAS
Directly False or Misleading Advertisements
Section 5 of the FTC Act is clearly violated when a company disseminates
advertisements which are, by their very terms, false or misleading. 45 This
rule of illegality applies even if the company is unaware that the ads are
deceptive 4 and does not actually intend to decei'e. 47  Moreover, proof of
actual deception is not required if the advertisements have the tendency or
capacity to deceive a significant group of persons towards whom the ads are
directed.4  Finally, the false or misleading representations need not be
"verbal;" nonverbal misrepresentations, such as pictures or demonstrations,
can be equally objectionable. 49
A leading-and extreme-case illustrative of these principles is the United
States Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.50 This
45. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937) (false claims concerning
"reduced" prices, "free" goods, and third party product testimonials); FTC v. Algoma Lumber
Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934) (false claims as to the nature of the product); FTC v. Royal Milling Co.,
288 U.S. 212 (1933) (false claims as to the advertisers' identities that affected purchase decision);
Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979) (false claims concerning effective-
ness of weight reduction tablets), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v.
FTC, 577 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1978) (exaggerated claims concerning product's ability to reduce air
pollutants in automobile exhaust); National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157
(7th Cir. 1977) (false claims by industry trade association that there was "no" scientific evidence
of health hazard associated with a product, when issue was actually in scientific dispute), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1977) (false
claims that company's mouthwash could prevent and cure colds and sore throats), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 950 (1978); Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (deceptive use of "bait and
switch" practices, false advertising of "easy credit" and false advertising of "sale" prices). See also
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1967) (false claims that products were
"unconditionally guaranteed" when guarantees enclosed with the products were actually condi-
tional).
46. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
47. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
48. See notes 12-18 and accompanying text supra.
49. See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965) (deceptive demonstrations
in television commercials); Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963) (same). See
generally Note, "Extrinsic Misrepresentations" in Advertising Under Section 5(a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 725 (1966).
50. 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
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case involved a section 5 proceeding against a manufacturer and its advertis-
ing agency 5' for use of a deceptive television commercial. The commercial
showed a supposed visual demonstration that the company's shaving cream
would "soften" even sandpaper. Unknown to the viewer, a mock-up consist-
ing of a layer of plexiglas coated with loose sand was used instead of sandpa-
per.
In upholding the Commission's determination that the commercial was
deceptive, the Supreme Court first noted that it was not concerned with
whether the product would actually soften sandpaper as asserted. 52  The
Court concluded that the "undisclosed" use of a mock-up to convey the "false
impression" that the consumer is seeing an "actual test, experiment or dem-
onstration" is, in itself, deceptive. 51 In so holding, the Court stressed the
Commission's "influential role" in prescribing what is, or is not, a deceptive
practice: "This Court has frequently stated that the Commission's judgment
is to be given great weight by reviewing courts. This admonition is especially
true with respect to allegedly deceptive advertising since the finding of a §5
violation in this field rests so heavily on inference and pragmatic judg-
ment." 5 4 The Court additionally emphasized the Commission's authority to
draw its own inferences as to the "tendency" of a verbal or nonverbal
advertising claim to "mislead," without resort to actual consumer testimony
or other proof of actual consumer deception:
Nor was it necessary for the Commission to conduct a survey of the
viewing public before it could determine that the commercials had a
tendency to mislead, for when the Commission finds deception it is also
authorized, within the bounds of reason, to infer that the deception will
constitute a material factor in a purchaser's decision to buy. 55
The Commission's determination that the nonverbal representation at
issue in Colgate-Palmolive was deceptive was accordingly upheld, notwith-
standing the total absence of any concrete, as opposed to conjectural, evi-
dence that any consumer had actually been deceived or misled.
A further illustration of directly false or misleading advertisements is
provided by the Commission's recent decision in In re lay Norris Corp.s5 A
mail order retailer of consumer products made deceptive advertising claims
in mail-order catalogs and newspapers that distorted performance and safety
characteristics of several of its products. For example, advertisements for a
propane flame gun claimed that the device would "whip" through the
"thickest" ice in only "seconds," when testimony by consumers and experts
established that consumers would need the patience of Job to actually melt
51. For a discussion of retailer and advertising agency liability, see notes 23-28 and accompa-
nying text supra.
52. 380 U.S. at 385-86.
53. Id. at 386-90.
54. Id. at 385 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 391-92.
56. 91 F.T.C. 751 (1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979).
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ice with the gun. Similarly, the company's advertisements for a roach pow-
der claimed that the product was perfectly "safe" to use, when the product
could actually injure consumers if not properly used. Given the magnitude
and severity of the advertising violations involved in the case, the Commis-
sion issued an order requiring the company to substantiate the validity of
"all" safety or performance claims for "any" of its mail-order products by
"competent and objective material available in written form." 5 7 This con-
cededly drastic relief was upheld on appeal to the Second Circuit against
charges of overbreadth, vagueness, and the possible chilling of first amend-
ment freedom of speech.5 8
Impliedly False or Misleading Advertisements
An advertisement can mislead by unspoken implication as well as by
directly false or misleading representations. Thus, an advertisement can be
"unfair and deceptive" within the meaning of section 5 of the FTC Act even
though every statement contained in the ad is literally true. 59 This result
commonly occurs when only part of the truth is told, while unfavorable
information that would discredit or contradict the affirmative statements is
withheld. Similarly, advertisements may deceive by means of unspoken in-
nuendo, if the consequence is a tendency for consumers to be misled.
A helpful illustration of advertisements that deceive by telling only part of
the truth is the Fourth Circuit's oft-cited decision in P. Lorillard Co. v.
FTC.60 Lorillard advertisements claimed that a Reader's Digest study had
determined that "Old Gold" cigarettes were lower than other brands in tar
and nicotine content. It was correct that a study published in the Reader's
Digest contained a table that did, indeed, show Old Gold lowest in these
product attributes. Lorillard did not, however, disclose that the study itself
had concluded that the difference was so marginal as to be insignificant,
thereby deceiving consumers into the erroneous impression that the study
had found the company's cigarettes to be significantly better than other
brands in terms of tar and nicotine content. The Fourth Circuit upheld the
Commission's determination that the ads violated section 5, reasoning that:
"To tell less than the whole truth is a well known method of deception; and
57. 91 F.T.C. at 851-58.
58. Jay Norris, Inc. v. FTC, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979). For
a survey of other advertising cases involving first amendment issues, see note 93 infra.
59. As stated by the Second Circuit in FTC v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir.
1963):
[W]e have increasingly come to recognize that "Advertisements as a whole may be
completely misleading although every sentence separately considered is literally true.
This may be because things are omitted that should be said, or because advertise-
ments are composed or purposefully printed in such a way as to mislead."
Id. at 675 (citation omitted).
60. 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950).
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he who deceives by resorting to such method cannot excuse the deception by
relying upon the truthfulness per se of the partial truth by which it has been
accomplished.""'
That advertisements may deceive by "innuendo" as well as by partial
truths is illustrated in the Sixth Circuit's decision in J.B. Williams Co. v.
FTC. 2 This case involved television commercials that claimed that people
who often feel tired and run down may be suffering from "iron poor blood,"
and that the company's product would make them feel stronger. The overall
implication was that most people suffering from tiredness and loss of strength
would feel better if they took the product. In actuality, most people suffering
from these symptoms have medical problems other than the iron deficiency
anemia that the product could help alleviate. In affirming the Commission's
holding that the commercials violated section 5, the court reasoned that by
creating a misleading impression that certain people would benefit from the
product, when this was not in fact true, the commercials had a tendency to
deceive 63
An extreme example of advertisements that deceive by innuendo is the
Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Simeon Management Corp. v. FTC. 4
This case concerned advertisements for a weight loss program described as
being "safe and effective." The ads did not disclose that the program entailed
use of a drug that had not been approved by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) for use in weight reduction. Neither the program nor the drug
were shown to be unsafe or ineffective; in fact, the company offered evi-
dence to support the safety and efficacy of the drug. The Ninth Circuit
nevertheless concluded that the ads were deceptive, reasoning that since
consumers assume that drugs are FDA regulated as to safety and efficacy, the
affirmative references in the advertisements to safety and efficacy tended to
mislead consumers to the erroneous belief that the program, including the
drug, had been FDA approved.6 5 In so holding, the court looked far beyond
the contents of the advertisement itself and considered factors independent of
the advertisement-consumer expectations as to FDA drug regulation-in
finding the advertisements to be impliedly deceptive.6 6
61. Id. at 58.
62. 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
63. Id. at 889-90.
64. 579 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1978).
65. Id. at 1145-46.
66. Id. at 1146. See also Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979)
(consumer testimonials for weight loss product implied that consumers could expect substantial
weight loss if they used the product, when most consumers would not achieve significant weight
losses); Waltham Watch Co. v. FTC, 318 F.2d 28 (7th Cir.) (company acquired trademark of a
well-known domestic manufacturer of clocks and used mark on imported, lower-grade clocks,
thereby falsely inferring that imported clocks were high quality clocks produced by the domestic
manufacturer), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 944 (1963); Ward Labs., Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952 (2d
Cir.) (company advertised its product as being able to treat baldness caused by bacteria,
inferring that most baldness is due to this problem, when product was actually ineffective in
treating most common causes of baldness), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827 (1960); General Motors
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Material Non-Disclosure
One of the more controversial doctrines to evolve under section 5 is the
"material non-disclosure" doctrine, whereby an advertisement may be
deemed unfair or deceptive because of its failure to disclose material infor-
mation to consumers.6 7 As discussed more fully below, the term "material
information" is not a concise concept. Rather, it is an umbrella phrase used
to cover a diverse range of fact situations, so that an all-encompassing
definition of the term is at best meaningless and at worst misleading. No
doubt much of the controversy surrounding the doctrine is due to the absence
of a clear definition of precisely what is "material" matter, subject to the
requirement of affirmative disclosure in advertisements.
Nevertheless, a close examination of case law reveals that several major
components of materiality have crystallized. In particular, most of the cases
to date that have applied the material non-disclosure doctrine to advertising
have used the doctrine specifically as an alternative label for advertising
practices considered false or misleading due to deceptive half-truths or mis-
leading innuendos. The Lorillard, J.B. Williams, and Simeon Management
decisions are illustrative of the use of the materiality concept as a logical
strategy for finding an advertisement impliedly false or misleading. Loril-
lard, for example, deceived consumers by stating that a survey rated its
brand of cigarettes as the lowest in tar and nicotine content, while failing to
disclose the survey's conclusion that the difference was so marginal as to be
insignificant.6 8  Similarly, J.B. Williams deceived consumers by implying
that many people would benefit from use of its product, while failing to
disclose that only a small percentage of users would actually benefit.6 9
Finally, Simeon Management deceived consumers by inferring the existence
of an FDA approval for its product and service, without disclosing that such
an approval had not actually been attained. 70
In each of these situations, express or implied claims in advertisements
were rendered false, or at the very least misleading, by the non-disclosure of
information known to the advertiser. The information withheld was thus
material in the sense that absent its disclosure, the advertisements became
Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1940) (company advertised credit terms for auto installment
contracts, showing financing charges as "6 %" of unpaid balance, thereby misleading public into
believing 6% was the "simple" interest figure, when in reality the simple interest rate was
11.5%), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 682 (1941).
67. See KANWIT, supra note 1, § 4.03; ROSDEN, supra note 1, § 18.04[1]. The material non-
disclosure doctrine is not limited to advertising practices only, but can arise in nonadvertising
contexts as well. See, e.g., cases cited in note 87 infra.
68. P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir. 1950). See also notes 60-61 and
accompanying text supra.
69. J.B. Williams Co., Inc. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884, 890 (6th Cir. 1967). See also notes 62-63
and accompanying text supra.
70. Simeon Mgm't Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1145-46 (9th Cir. 1978). See also notes 64-
66 and accompanying text supra.
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deceptive. From these and other comparable decisions, 7' a major facet of the
material non-disclosure doctrine can be identified. Information is "material"
within the meaning of the material non-disclosure doctrine, and therefore
subject to the requirement of affirmative disclosure, if it tends to undercut or
discredit partial truths contained in an advertisement or would correct or
counteract misleading innuendos implicit in an advertisement.
A review of the case law reveals that the material non-disclosure doctrine
has been extended still further to require the affirmative disclosure of nonob-
vious health or safety risks associated with the use of a product or service.
The rationale for requiring such disclosures is that consumers "assume that
products put into commerce are safe under normal use" and, hence, that
nondisclosure of product health and safety problems has the effect of deceiv-
ing consumers into purchasing something that they might not otherwise have
purchased.7 2  In accordance with this rationale, nonobvious health and
safety hazards must be disclosed not only when safety-related claims are
contained in the advertisements that render the ads impliedly false, but also
when no safety claims are made at all. 73  In either situation, failure to
disclose the hazard is considered inherently unfair and deceptive.
The leading safety disclosure case is In re Stupell Enterprises,7 4 in which
the Commission outlined several of the leading principles that govern the
material non-disclosure doctrine as applied to health and safety factors. The
case involved a children's toy, consisting of a pair of goggles to which a
punching ball was attached by a rubber string, that could cause severe eye
damage if it malfunctioned. The toy was packaged in such a way that the
hazard was not apparent, and no disclosure of the risk was made in either the
advertising or the package label. The Commission held that non-disclosure of
the safety risk constituted an unfair and deceptive practice. 75 The Commis-
sion added the significant caveat, however, that advertisers need not disclose
"all conceivable hazards which might result" from use of their products. 7
Rather, advertisers are simply required to disclose "nonobvious" health and
safety hazards that may arise, 77 with the precise nature of this obligation
varying from case to case. 78  Factors to be considered in determining
71. See cases cited in note 33 supra.
72. See, e.g., In re Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 456 (1972), affd, 481 F.2d
246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); In re Stupell Enterprises, 67 F.T.C. 173, 187-
88 (1965).
73. See, e.g., Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); In re Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 456 (1972),
afJ'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
74. 67 F.T.C. 173 (1965).
75. Id. at 187-88.
76. Id.
77. Nonobvious dangers are those that are not readily observable and are not a matter of
general public knowledge. For example, advertisers need not warn of the effects of drinking
alcohol, since these effects are generally known. See 1 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR
CoMPErITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES 652 (L. Altman 4th rev. ed. 1981).
78. In re Stupell Enterprises, 67 F.T.C. 173, 187 (1965).
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whether disclosure is necessary include: the extent and severity of the hazard;
the likelihood that injury may occur; the sophistication of the audience
toward whom the advertisement is directed or likely to be influenced by the
advertisement; the alternatives to advertising disclosure, such as conspicuous
disclosures on product labels; and the likelihood that consumers will detect
the hazard on their own prior to making their purchase. 79 Depending upon
how these and other possibly relevant considerations are resolved, latent
health and safety hazards in a product may be deemed "material" informa-
tion that must be affirmatively disclosed.
Recent complaints issued by the Federal Trade Commission reflect still a
further extension of the material non-disclosure doctrine to encompass prod-
uct defects which, while economically costly to the consumer, do not create
actual health or safety hazards. Thus, complaints have issued during the past
two years alleging that it is "unfair or deceptive" to fail to disclose nonobvi-
ous defects in heat pumps necessitating expensive repairs,80 nonobvious de-
fects in automobile bumpers causing them to rust out prematurely,81 and
nonobvious defects in automobile engines or transmissions requiring costly
repairs. 82 It is impossible to derive definitive conclusions from these com-
plaints, since they either are still in litigation or were issued in conjunction
with negotiated consent orders. Thus, the theoretical underpinnings of the
complaints may ultimately be rejected or modified by the Commission or the
courts. As the complaints currently stand, however, they reflect two alto-
gether different theoretical approaches to the product defects issue.
The first such approach is merely a logical application of the deception
theory developed in In re Stupell and other litigated product safety cases.
According to this approach, consumers expect products to be free of major
defects, unless they have been specifically informed otherwise or the defects
are evident. If a company marketing a product is aware of a significant and
nonobvious defect in its product and fails to disclose it, the company unfairly
and deceptively exploits the consumer's normal expectations. 83  The net
result is that the consumer is deceived into purchasing a product that he
might not otherwise have purchased.
84
79. Id. at 187-88.
80. In re Fedders Corp., 93 F.T.C. 949 (1979).
81. In re Chrysler Corp., 96 F.T.C. 134 (1980).
82. In re Ford Motor Co., 96 F.T.C. 362 (1980) (consent order); In re Volkswagen of
America, Inc., FTC Dkt. 9154 (complaint issued April 1, 1981) (case still in litigation); In re
General Motors Corp., FTC Dkt. 9145 (complaint issued Aug. 7, 1980) (case still in litigation).
83. Cf. In re Stupell Enterprises, 67 F.T.C. 173, 187-88 (1965) (nondisclosure of product
safety risk deceptively and unfairly exploits consumer's assumption that product marketed with
no apparent restrictions is safe for particular use intended). See notes 72-79 and accompanying
text supra.
84. See, e.g., In re Fedders Corp., 93 F.T.C. 949 (1979) (consent complaint alleged that
company unfairly or deceptively failed to disclose a known and potentially costly latent product
defect when disclosure would probably have affected consumer's purchase decision).
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This first line of reasoning assumes, however, that the company knew of
the defect when it made the sales, thereby deceiving "prospective" pur-
chasers. Some of the product defect complaints have gone a major step
further, and have alleged that it is unfair or deceptive to fail to notify "past"
purchasers of a major nonobvious product defect once the defect comes to the
company's attention.8 5  The rationale for this retrospective disclosure re-
quirement is that past purchasers will otherwise be "unfairly" or "decep-
tively" prevented from taking precautionary measures needed to minimize
their economic losses. 86  Obviously, these cases take us well beyond the law
of advertising per se and are more akin to cases applying the material non-
disclosure doctrine in contexts other than advertising.8 It remains to be seen
whether the Commission will actually adopt this far-reaching retroactive
disclosure requirement, adopt the more limited requirement that prospective
purchasers be informed of known latent defects, or reject both theories.
However, since cases involving these issues are currently in litigation before
the Commission,88 further needed guidance can be expected in the near
future.
The question of whether the material non-disclosure doctrine should be
extended to include latent defects that are not safety-related is part of a
broader debate as to how far the doctrine should be expanded. Some com-
mentators would expand the doctrine to include much more than safety
hazards or product defects, and would require affirmative disclosure in
advertisements of any information needed by the consumer to make an
informed purchase decision. Thus, it has been argued that all information
85. See In re Chrysler Corp., 96 F.T.C. 134 (1980) (consent complaint alleged that company
unfairly or deceptively failed to disclose a potentially costly product defect to past purchasers
once defect became known, when disclosure would have enabled the purchasers to take neces-
sary corrective action and avoid economic injury). See also In re Ford Motor Co., 96 F.T.C. 362
(1980) (consent complaint); In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., FTC Dkt. 9154 (complaint
issued April 1, 1981) (case still in litigation); In re General Motors Corp., FTC Dkt. 9145
(complaint issued Aug. 7, 1980) (case still in litigation).
86. See note 85 supra.
87. See, e.g., Tashof v. FTC, 437 F.2d 707 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (upholding Commission
determination that it was unfair and deceptive for company to use confusing credit sales
contracts with indigent consumers that did not disclose key credit terms in a way that they could
comprehend); In re Genesco, Inc., 89 F.T.C. 451 (1977) (holding unfair and deceptive compa-
ny's practice of writing off consumer credit balances to its own account without first disclosing
the existence of the balances to the consumers affected); In re Beneficial Corp., 86 F.T.C. 119
(1975) (holding that it was unfair and deceptive for a finance company that also conducted a tax
preparation service to fail to disclose that confidential information obtained from users of the tax
service would be used to solicit loan customers), rev'd in part on other grounds, 542 F.2d 611 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977); In re All State Indus. of N.C., Inc., 89 F.T.C. 451
(1977) (holding that it was unfair and deceptive for a company to fail to disclose that its
consumer sales contracts would be negotiated to a finance company, thereby cutting off con-
sumer defenses under the holder-in-due-course doctrine).
88. See cases currently in litigation cited in note 82 supra.
570 [Vol. 30:555
1981] UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING 571
which "could affect the tendency to buy or not to buy,"8 or which "the
consumer needs to make an 'informed' choice," 90 should be disclosed. Other
commentators, however, view the doctrine more restrictively, and would
limit its application to only those situations actually hammered out in prior
litigation. Proponents of this more restrictive position argue that "the FTC
has no power to order full disclosure in advertising," ' and that the scope of
the Commission's powers is limited to preventing deceptive and misleading
statements in advertisements or warning against the possible consequences
arising from use of a product.92 Close scrutiny of each of these positions
indicates that neither, standing alone, is persuasive.
From the standpoint of practicality, the latter position seems the more
persuasive of the two views. If, as the expansionist view suggests, advertise-
ments should contain literally everything that the consumer requires to make
an informed purchase decision, consumers will then find themselves bom-
barded by a proliferation of miscellaneous product information. Advertise-
ments will look increasingly like actual purchase contracts rather than mere
promotional messages. The result will likely be consumer confusion instead
of consumer enlightenment. An additional concern is that by increasing the
cost of advertising, an overly demanding disclosure requirement will possibly
discourage the use of many forms of advertising, thereby chilling the dissemi-
nation of truthful product information and violating first amendment
rights.9 3 Even assuming that such a chilling effect does not result, signifi-
cant product information may, at the least, become clouded in a mist of
miscellaneous purchase information of far less significance.
89. E. KINTNER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEvriVE PRAcricEs 107 (2d ed. 1978). Kintner
argues:
Generally speaking, an advertisement should set forth whatever the purchaser would
normally want to know about the nature and use of the product. If certain informa-
tion could affect the tendency to buy or not to buy, then it is a safe bet that such
information should be disclosed in advertising.
Id.
90. Morse, A Consumer's View of the FTC Regulation of Advertising, 17 U. KAN. L. REv.
639 (1969). Morse argues that the "standard requires the seller not only to be truthful, but to
empathize with the consumer by showing all the information about the product or service which
the consumer needs to make an 'informed' choice." Id. at 640.
91. Anderson & Winer, Corrective Advertising: The FTC's New Formula for Effective
Relief, 50 TEx. L. REv. 312, 320 (1972).
92. Lemke, Souped up Affirmative Disclosure Orders of the Federal Trade Commission, 4
U. MicH. J.L. REo'. 180, 188 (1970). See also ROSOEN, supra note 1, §§ 18.04[1], [4].
93. The Supreme Court has specifically held that the constitutional safeguards of the first
amendment extend to advertising and other forms of commercial speech. See, e.g., Virginia Bd.
of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Ass'n v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). The Court has
made it clear, however, that the first amendment does not preclude federal or state action
designed to prevent advertisements from being false, misleading, or otherwise deceptive. See,
e.g., Virginia Bd. of Pharm. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 771-72;
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at 383. See generally KANWIT, supra note 1, §§ 22.07, .10;
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Thus, it would seem that the expansionist viewpoint goes too far. This is
not to say, however, that the opposite position is itself blemish free. Those
critics who would limit the disclosure requirement only to those situations
already hammered out in litigation are, in essence, taking a position that is
inconsistent with the history of section 5. When Congress enacted section 5
with its broad prohibition of "unfair" or "deceptive" acts or practices, it gave
far-reaching discretion to the Commission to interpret these terms as evolv-
ing concepts. Specifically, "the proscriptions . . . are flexible, 'to be defined
with particularity by the myriad of cases from the field of business.' "04 It
would be a serious error to completely tie the Commission's hands in a
significant area of evolving section 5 law-the area of material non-disclo-
sure. For the protection of consumers and competing advertisers alike, the
Commission should be able to expand the doctrine of material non-disclosure
as required by new and previously unforeseen fact situations.
What, then, is a "material" fact within the meaning of the material non-
disclosure doctrine as applied to advertisements in particular? The safest
answer is that the definition of materiality is still evolving, and will continue
to evolve as different fact situations confront the Commission. Thus, a
precise definition that would encompass all possible fact situations cannot be
given. Nevertheless, at least some components of the definition have crystal-
lized, suggesting that information may be material and require affirmative
disclosure in advertisements if: (1) the information undercuts or discredits
partial truths contained in an advertisement; (2) the information would
correct or counteract misleading innuendos contained in an advertisement;
(3) the information concerns latent product health or safety hazards; or (4)
possibly, the information concerns nonobvious and significant product de-
fects, even though not safety-related.
Pitofsky, supra note 1, at 672-73; Reich, Preventing Deception in Commercial Speech, 54
N.Y.U. L. REV. 775 (1979).
For examples of FTC advertising cases in which first amendment defenses have been raised
but rejected, see Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. FTC, 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1979) (rejecting first
amendment challenge to a product safety "affirmative disclosure" order), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
950 (1980); Jay Norris, Inc., v. FTC, 598 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir.) (rejecting first amendment
challenge to an "ad substantiation" order), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); Warner-Lambert
Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1977) (rejecting first amendment challenge to a "corrective
advertising" order), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1978); In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C.
406 (1980) (rejecting first amendment challenge to an "ad substantiation" order), enforced sub
nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1982).
For examples in which first amendment defense arguments have prevailed on appeal of
particularly burdensome FTC orders, see Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653 (9th
Cir. 1978) (order covered literally thousands of products, even though only a few advertisements
and products were involved in proven law violations); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611
(3d Cir. 1976) (order flatly prohibited use of an advertising slogan, where Commission had not
shown that qualifying language would not remove the deception inherent in the slogan).
94. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965). See also FTC v. R.F. Keppel
& Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 310-12 (1934). But see Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 654 F.2d 599 (9th Cir.
1981) (holding that when an FI'C adjudication had widespread application, the FTC exceeded
its authority by proceeding by adjudication rather than by rule-making). See generally
KANWIT, supra note 1, § 3.03.
[Vol. 30:555572
1981] UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING 573
Unsubstantiated Advertising Claims
A doctrine often confused with the "material non-disclosure" doctrine, but
conceptually altogether different, is the doctrine of "ad substantiation."
Certainly one of the most controversial developments in section 5 case law,95
this doctrine mandates that affirmative product claims in advertisements
must be supported by reasonable substantiating data.96 Moreover, the ad-
vertiser must possess and rely upon this data before making the claims.
Therefore, it is no defense that the claims are proven to be true after the
fact.9
7
95. See generally KANWIT, supra note 1, § 35.05[4].
96. See, e.g., In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406 (1980) (claims that dishwasher did
not require pre-rinsing or scraping of dishes lacked prior reasonable basis), appeal docketed,
enforced sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Fedders
Corp., 85 F.T.C. 38 (1975) (claims that company's air conditioners had unique characteristics
not possessed by competing air conditioners lacked prior reasonable supporting data), af'd, 529
F.2d 1398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976); In re Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 84
F.T.C. 1493 (1974) (claims that gasoline additive would reduce air pollutants lacked a reason-
able basis, since company had not conducted prior scientific tests, and available evidence
indicated that claims greatly exaggerated the product's actual effectiveness); In re National
Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488 (1973) (performance claims concerning a product had a
reasonable basis where company, acting in "good faith" and with "reasonable prudence," had
relied upon technically deficient third party tests), rev'd in part on other grounds, 482 F.2d 1333
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974); In re Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398
(1972) (claims that company's tires would stop cars "25% quicker" lacked a reasonable basis
since substantiating test results made under abnormal road conditions could not be extrapolated
to normal road conditions), aff'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 112 (1973).
97. See, e.g., In re National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 549-50 (1973), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974); In re Pfizer, Inc., 81
F.T.C. 23, 64, 67 (1972). It is on this ground that the ad substantiation doctrine is undoubtedly
most vulnerable to criticism. As observed by the new Chairman of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, James C. Miller III, the rule that an advertiser cannot establish the truth of his claims after
the fact is somewhat analogous to having an IRS audit in which the taxpayer must either have his
supporting records already on hand, or be flatly precluded from defending his otherwise valid
claims, regardless of his good or bad faith. See Remarks of James C. Miller III, Chairman of
Federal Trade Commission, before the American Advertising Federation, in Washington, D.C.
(December 8, 1981).
Nevertheless, the "prior substantiation" requirement follows logically from the theoretical
underpinnings of the ad substantiation doctrine itself, as currently articulated in Commission
and court decisions. The underlying theory is that when an advertiser makes affirmative adver-
tising claims, he thereby implies to the consumer that he already has reasonable data to
substantiate the claims, resulting in consumer deception if he actually has no such data in his
possession. See, e.g., In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 520-21 (1980), enforced sub
nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1982); Jay Norris, Inc. v. FTC, 598
F.2d 1244, 1251-52 (2d Cir. 1979).
By somewhat modifying the theoretical basis of the doctrine, a less drastic rule would be
possible. If it is instead argued that the inference of affirmative advertising claims is simply that
the advertiser can substantiate the accuracy of the claims, then after-the-fact substantiation
would still be possible. This more restricted view of the doctrine is not, however, the one found
in the few litigated decisions on ad substantiation that have thus far appeared. See, e.g., the
cases cited in note 96 supra.
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The genesis of the doctrine was the In re Pfizer, Inc. 8 decision, in which
the Commission announced that it is a violation of section 5 to "make an
affirmative product claim without a reasonable basis for making that
claim." 99 The case involved a nonprescription drug for use in the treatment
of minor burns and sunburns. The manufacturer's advertisements expressly
claimed that the product would "'relieve pain fast" and "anesthetize nerves."
While the company had not performed specific scientific tests to verify the
accuracy of these claims, it had conducted a search of the medical literature
and consulted with medical experts before making the claims.
The Commission dismissed the complaint, holding that the FTC staff had
failed to prove that the literature search and expert opinion employed by the
company did not constitute sufficient substantiation.10 0 In so holding, the
Commission set forth the basic framework of what has since become known
as the "ad substantiation" doctrine. As further clarified in subsequent deci-
sions by the Commission,' 0' the basic elements of the doctrine include the
following.
First, express claims in advertisements must be supported by a prior "rea-
sonable basis."'10 2  The test of what constitutes a reasonable basis looks to
that information which would satisfy a "reasonably prudent businessman,"
acting in "good faith," that his claims are supported by adequate evi-
dence. 10 3 In making this determination, a number of factors may be rele-
vant, such as the type and specificity of the claims; the nature of the product
and possible consequences to the consumer if the claims are false; the extent
to which consumers can make their own independent assessment of the
validity of the claims; and the nature and availability to the advertiser of
reliable evidence that would substantiate or refute the claims. 0 4
Second, the initial burden of proof in litigation is on the FTC staff to
establish the general type of substantiating evidence required to make out a
reasonable basis for particular claims. 105 Once this showing has been made,
however, the advertiser must demonstrate that it possessed the requisite
substantiating data before making the claims in question.106
98. 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972).
99. Id. at 62.
100. Id. at 73-74.
101. See, e.g., cases cited in note 96 supra.
102. See, e.g., In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 95 F.T.C. 406, 520-521 (1980), enforced sub.
nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 676 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Fedders Corp., 85
F.T.C. 38, 64-65 (1975), af'd, 529 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976); In re
Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 84 F.T.C. 1493, 1548-49 (1974); In re Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C.
23. 62 (1972).
103. See, e.g., In re National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 553 (1973), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974); In re Pfizer, Inc., 81
F.T.C. 23, 64 (1972).
104. See, e.g., In re Peacock Buick, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1532, 1564 (1975); In re Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398, 451-52 (1972), affd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1112 (1973); In re Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 73 (1972).
105. See, e.g., In re National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 559-60 (1973), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974); In re Pfizer, Inc., 81
F.T.C. 23, 73 (1972).
106. See, e.g., cases cited in note 96 supra.
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Third, the substantiating material must be in the advertiser's possession
before it makes the advertising claims. Substantiation after the fact is no
defense. 107
Fourth, substantiating data is not needed for literally every claim con-
tained in an advertisement. Mere hyperbole or claims that constitute obvious
puffing are not subject to the doctrine, 08 since consumers do not reasonably
expect claims of this type to be backed up by actual supporting data.
Finally, good faith reliance upon the sort of data that would satisfy a
reasonably prudent businessman is all that is required. 09 Hence, even
though the supporting evidence is technically deficient, it may still provide a
reasonable basis if the conditions of good faith and reasonable prudence are
met."10
These basic principles are illustrated by the Commission's decision in In re
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co."' In relevant part, the case involved advertis-
ing claims that improved Firestone tires would stop cars "25% quicker."
Firestone had conducted tests on the accuracy of the claims under abnormal
road conditions and had determined that the tires would, indeed, stop cars
25% faster than normal tires. It had not, however, conducted tests under
normal road conditions, and expert opinion indicated that the tires might
perform altogether differently under normal conditions.
The Commission, applying the basic analytical framework described
above, held that the limited tests conducted by Firestone did not adequately
substantiate the broad claims made.1 2  Since the claims in issue involved a
matter of "human safety," and were of a type that consumers could not
reasonably "verify" for themselves, the Commission concluded that particu-
larly rigorous substantiating data was essential. Specifically, a requirement
of scientific test data was imposed' ' 3-a requirement that Firestone had
failed to meet with the limited tests that it had conducted.
A further illustrative decision is In re National Dynamics Corp.14 This
case involved affirmative advertising claims concerning the effectiveness of a
battery additive. The company had the product evaluated repeatedly over a
ten year period by six independent product testing laboratories. Some of the
evaluations were actual product performance tests, while others were inde-
pendent assessments of the validity of earlier tests. The tests generally sup-
ported the advertising claims in issue, but contained methodological flaws
that discredited their validity as competent scientific tests. Notwithstanding
107. See the discussion and cases cited in note 97 supra.
108. See In re Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 64 (1972).
109. See, e.g., In re National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488, 556-57 (1973), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974); In re Pfizer, Inc., 81
F.T.C. 23, 64 (1972).
110. See notes 114 & 115 and accompanying text infra.
111. 81 F.T.C. 398 (1972), aJJ'd, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
112. 81 F.T.C. at 449.
113. Id. at 451-52.
114. 82 F.T.C. 488 (1973), rev'd in part on other grounds, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974).
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the defects in the tests, the Commission held that the company had sufficient
substantiation for its claims, since the company had "reasonably" and "in
good faith" relied upon the product evaluations.1 5  In so holding, the Com-
mission placed particular emphasis upon the fact that the ad substantiation
doctrine does not mandate the use of ideal or ultimate supporting evidence.
Rather, the doctrine simply requires that advertisers exercise good faith and
reasonable prudence in substantiating the validity of significant affirmative
claims contained in their advertisements.
Unfair Advertisements That Are Not Deceptive
As noted earlier, an unfair act or practice is not always a deceptive act or
practice." 6 Instead, the concept of an "unfair" practice overlaps and goes
beyond that of a "deceptive" practice. Thus, while a deceptive practice will
also be considered unfair, an unfair practice can be something other than an
outright deception.
In most advertising cases, this distinction will be of interest only to the
legal semanticist, since the particular advertising practice in question will
generally be considered both deceptive and unfair. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court has highlighted the potential importance of the distinction
between the two terms. In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.," 7 the Court
specifically rejected an argument that section 5 prohibits "only such prac-
tices" as are "in violation of the antitrust laws, deceptive or repugnant to
public morals."" 8 Instead, the Court analogized the "fairness" powers of
the Commission under section 5 to those of a "court of equity.""' 9 The
Court further provided general guidance concerning the broad concept of
unfairness when it went on to cite the following governing factors with
apparent approval: "(1) Whether the practice 'offends public policy' as
prescribed by 'statutes, the common law . . . or other established concept[s]
of unfairness;' (2) Whether the practice is 'immoral, unethical, oppressive or
unscrupulous;' (3) Whether the practice 'causes substantial injury to con-
sumers.' " 120
Thus, the legal precedent for finding a practice unfair that is not also
deceptive does exist. Actual application of this distinction in the specific
context of advertising, however, is all but non-existent. Moreover, the exact
parameters of the unfairness doctrine have been left relatively vague and
115. 82 F.T.C. at 553, 556-57.
116. See notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra.
117. 405 U.S. 233 (1972). The case concerned alleged antitrust violations, not false advertis-
ing. Nevertheless, the Court's opinion contained statements that cut across the entire range of
"unfair" practices under section 5, including consumer protection as well as antitrust matters.
118. Id. at 235, 244.
119. Id. at 244.
120. Id. at 244 n.5. See also Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 287, 293 n.8 (7th Cir. 1976);
Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321, 323 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 62 (1972).
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uncertain by even the few cases that have addressed the issue, leaving many
important questions unresolved. For example, what is meant by a practice
that "offends public policy?" What types of "substantial injury to consumers"
can be proscribed as unfair, even though not deceptive? And, most opaque of
all, what is meant by a practice that is "immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous?"
In an attempt to answer these and related questions, the Commission in
late 1980 issued a formal Policy Statement addressed to a Senate subcommit-
tee that outlined the general scope of its consumer unfairness jurisdiction. 2'
In this Statement, the Commission asserted that the primary focus of the
unfairness standard is upon the third of the factors enumerated in Sperry &
Hutchinson--"substantial injury to consumers." According to the Commis-
sion, a finding of unfairness can be premised on this ground alone, provided
that three subsidiary conditions are satisfied. First, the consumer injury must
be substantial. Second, the injury must outweigh any countervailing benefits
to consumers or competition derived from the challenged practice. And
third, the injury must not be something that consumers themselves could
reasonably have avoided.12 2
The Commission's Policy Statement next addressed the first of the factors
identified in Sperry & Hutchinson-whether the practice "offends public
policy." The Commission reasoned that while this consideration may occa-
sionally serve as an independent ground for finding a practice unfair, it is
customarily used as an indicator of whether the primary factor-substantial
consumer injury-is present. 2 3 The Commission emphasized that, to be
relevant, the policy must be "clear and well-established" and must consist of
more than isolated viewpoints. Specifically, the public policy asserted as
evidence of substantial consumer injury or as a separate ground for a finding
of unfairness must be widely shared and embodied in formal sources such as
statutes or judicial decisions. 124
Turning to the final factor listed in Sperry & Hutchinson-"unethical or
unscrupulous conduct"-the Commission indicated that it does not intend to
rely upon this factor alone. It observed that this consideration is essentially
duplicative of the consumer injury inquiry, since "unethical" or "unscrupu-
lous" conduct that would draw fire from the Commission would probably
also cause substantial consumer injury. Accordingly, the Commission stated
that future action by the agency based upon the consumer unfairness stand-
ard will look only to issues of clear public policy and, in particular, substan-
tial consumer injury.12 5
121. Letter from Federal Trade Commission to Honorable Wendell H. Ford, Chairman,
Consumer Subcommittee, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, United States
Senate (Dec. 17, 1980), [1981] 5 TRADE Rac. REP. (CCH) 1 50,421.
122. Id. at 55,948-,949.
123. Id. at 55,949-,950.
124. Id. at 55,950-,951.
125. Id. at 55,951.
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The analytical framework outlined in the Commission's Policy Statement
follows the approach generally taken in the few litigated cases that have
employed the consumer unfairness doctrine. For example, in one leading
case, the Commission essentially employed the "consumer injury" and "pub-
lic policy" considerations to hold that the practice of using a gambling
scheme to induce children to buy products was unfair within the meaning of
section 5.126 Upon opening the product package, the children received
either just the product, a prize, or what amounted to an extra price tag. The
Supreme Court agreed with the Commission that this practice violated sec-
tion 5, noting first that the practice did not involve an actual fraud or other
deception. 127 Having dispensed with the deception theory, the Court went
on to uphold the determination that the practice was unfair, reasoning that
the practice was designed to "exploit consumers, children, who are unable to
protect themselves" and involved an activity, gambling, "which the common
law and criminal statutes have long deemed contrary to public policy.' 128
In essence, the Court employed the same line of reasoning outlined in the
Commission's Policy Statement. Thus, the practice was held "unfair" be-
cause it caused injury to a group of consumers unable to protect themselves;
it contained no countervailing benefits; and it violated clear and widely
shared concepts of public policy expressed in formal sources.
A more recent example of the manner in which the consumer unfairness
doctrine has been applied is provided by In re Raymond Lee Organiza-
tion.12  The case involved a patent application service for inventors that
proved to be of little real value to its users. The company's advertisements
and other promotions falsely exaggerated the probable benefits provided by
the service, and the Commission easily found these advertising practices to be
both unfair and deceptive. 130 Of greater difficulty, however, was the issue
of whether it was unfair for the company to retain money obtained from
consumers for a service that was not only of far less value than they had been
led to believe, but that was of little actual value. Answering this question in
the affirmative, the Commission pointed to state court decisions ordering
relief in analogous situations of fraud,' and placed particular emphasis
upon the substantial consumer injury that would result from allowing the
company to retain the money under these circumstances. 132 Once again,
consumer injury and public policy were the guiding considerations utilized in
finding a practice unfair. 133
In summary, while there is a definite paucity of clear precedent on the
consumer unfairness doctrine, particularly as applied to advertising, some
126. In re R.F. Keppel & Bros., 15 F.T.C. 276, 285 (1931).
127. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 309 (1934).
128. Id. at 313.
129. 92 F.T.C. 489 (1978).
130. Id. at 651-52.
131. Id. at 632.
132. Id.
133. See also cases cited in note 120 supra.
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general considerations can be gleaned from the Commission's formal Policy
Statement and from the limited case law available. First, the Commission
has the authority to challenge an advertising practice as unfair that is not
actually deceptive. Second, when making an unfairness determination, the
Commission will focus primarily upon the apparent injury to consumers.
The injury must be substantial, must not be outweighed by countervailing
benefits, and must be of a type that consumers cannot reasonably avoid.
Third, while public policy may constitute a separate theoretical ground for
finding a practice unfair, it will normally serve merely as evidence of sub-
stantial consumer injury. In any event, the public policy must be embodied
in formal sources and must be widely shared. Finally, while the Commission
and the courts at one time indicated that amorphous concepts such as "eth-
ics" and "morality" might serve as an alternative basis for finding a practice
unfair,13 4 the Commission has abandoned this earlier position. Instead, the
Commission has stated its express intention to assess the unfairness of non-
deceptive practices solely in terms of more concrete considerations of con-
sumer injury, countervailing competitive or consumer benefits, and formal
expressions of public policy. 35
CONCLUSION
If one message rings loud and clear from the preceding discussion, it is that
the FTC law of advertising is not fixed and immutable. The subject is a
protean one that continues to evolve with the development of additional case
law. Nevertheless, several guiding questions can be deduced from the avail-
able precedent-questions that the advertiser or practitioner should ask
when assessing the section 5 legality of a particular advertisement:
(1) Is the advertisement subject to a specific FTC Trade Regulation Rule
or Guide? If so, does it satisfy the requirements of the Rule or Guide?
(2) Does the advertisement contain verbal representations that tend to be
directly false or misleading to a significant group of consumers toward
whom the advertisement is directed?
(3) Does the advertisement contain nonverbal representations, such as
pictures or performance demonstrations, that have the tendency or capac-
ity to mislead a significant group of consumers within the target audience?
(4) Does the advertisement contain representations that tell only part of
the truth, while withholding information that discredits or contradicts the
representations made?
(5) Does the advertisement contain representations that have the tendency
or capacity to deceive by innuendo, due to false or misleading inferences
implicit in the representations?
(6) Does the advertisement fail to disclose information that is material in
the sense that its nondisclosure will tend to mislead consumers into errone-
ous assumptions as to the meaning of the advertisement?
134. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
135. See notes 121-25 and accompanying text supra.
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(7) Does the advertisement fail to disclose significant, nonobvious health
or safety hazards associated with the product, or, possibly, non-safety-
related product defects that subject consumers to substantial economic
injury?
(8) Are significant express claims contained in the advertisement substanti-
ated by prior reasonable supporting evidence, as determined by factors
such as: the nature and specificity of the claims; the nature of the product;
the possible consequences to the consumer if the claims are false; the extent
to which consumers can make their own independent assessments of the
validity of the claims; and the nature and availability of reliable substanti-
ating evidence?
(9) Assuming that the advertising is not deceptive, is it nevertheless unfair,
in light of: substantial consumer injury; the absence of off-setting benefits
promoted by the particular practice in issue; and such formal expressions
of public policy as statutes and judicial decisions?
No single list of factors can be all-inclusive, given the inherently complex
nature of the law of advertising. Nevertheless, the considerations outlined
above are certainly among those that have proved most troublesome, so that
the advertisers would be wise to reconsider any advertising program that
raises doubts concerning compliance with these factors.
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